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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
ANNOTATED WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By FRANK MURRAY**

TOPIC D.

INFORMAL CONTRACTS WITHOUT ASSENT
OR CONSIDERATION

85.

Assent or consideration unnecessary in cases enumerated In Sections 86-90

86.

Promise to pay a debt is binding though the debt is barred by the
Statute of Limitations

87.

Promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is binding

88.

Promise to fulfill a duty in spite of non-performance of a condition is binding when

89.

Promise to perform a voidable duty is binding

90.

Promise reasonably inducing definite and substantial action Is
binding

91.

Promises enumerated in Sections 86-90 if conditional are performable only on happening of condition

92.
93.

To whom promises enumerated in Sections 86-89 must be made
Promises enumerated in Sections 86-89 not binding if made In
ignorance of facts

94.

Stipulations

Section 85. ASSENT OR
CASES ENuMERATED iN SEC I

CONSIDERATIONI UNNECESSARY

IN

s 86-90.

Neither an expression of assent, unless the promise is in
terms conditional upon such an expression, nor consideration
is requisite for the formation of an informal contract in the
cases enumerated in Sections 86 to 90.
*This is a continuation of the Kentucky Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts. The work is being done by Professor Frank
Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky in cooperation
with the Kentucky State Bar Association.
**Frank Murray, A. B., Univ. of Montana; LL. B. 1925, Univ. of
Montana; S. J. D. 1930, Harvard Univ.; Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of
Montana School of Law, 1928-29; Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kentucky College of Law since 1930.
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Annotation:
We have in general reached the same result that would be attained
by a strict application of this section, but with entirely different language and reasoning. The doctrine is a remnant of the idea of
moral consideration and that explanation is still used by our courts.
In other cases the new promise is spoken of as a "ratification,"
"affirmance" or even "waiver."
Regardless of whether it would be better in some cases to frankly
acknowledge these promises as contracts without consideration, it is
clear that our decisions would not allow this explanation in some
situations. If the new promise is a contract it could be made the
foundation of an action. This is true of a promise made after the
original cause is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and there the
suit must be on the new promise - Wurth v. City of Paducah, 116 Ky .
403, 76 S.W. 143; Turner v. Everett, 5 K. L. R. 325; West v. Williams
d Son, 202 Ky. 382, 259 S.W. 1015. But this section refers also to
promises made before the statute has run. In this case the new promise cannot be the foundation of an action - Gilmore v. Green, 77 Ky.
(14 Bush) 772; Car's Exr. v. Robinson, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 269; Hopkins
v. Stout, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 375. This section includes promises to perform a voidable duty (Sec. 89) such as a promise by an adult to perform a contract entered into during infancy. Here again it is doubtful If our Court considers the new promise as a contract in itself
since it is proper that suit should be brought on the old obligation.
It is said, "the real effect of a confirmation is only to prevent an
avoidance" - Best v. Givens, 42 Ky. (3 B. M.) 72. Again when the
suit must be on the original obligation, the character of Its evidence,
and not that of the new promise determine the period of limitationAbner v. York, 19 K. L. R. 643, 41 S.W. 309; Gilmore v. Green, supra;
Hopkins v. Stout, supra; Sisk Adm. v. Sisk's Adr., 19? Ky. 672, 234
S. W. 296.
This section states that assent is required only when the new
promise Is conditional upon such expression. Assent was required in
Farrell'sAdm. v. Records, 187 Ky. 468, 219 S.W. 792 (Promise to pay
part if accepted in full satisfaction). Brashears v. Combs, 174 Ky.
344, 192 S.W. 482, apparently goes beyond this in requiring an acceptance of any conditional promise, as a promise to pay "when able,"
although the assent may be implied from an attempt to enforce the
promise.

Section 86. PIOMISE TO PAY A DEBT IS BINDING THOUGH
THE DEBT IS

BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

1. Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to fulfill all
or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual duty
K. L.-5
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for the payment of money due from the promisor, other than a
judgment, is binding if the antecedent duty was once enforceable
by direct action, and is either still so enforceable or would be
except for the effect of a statute of limitations.
2. The following facts operate as such a promise as that
stated in Subsection (1) unless other circumstances indicate a
different intention:
(a)
A voluntary acknowledgment to the obligee, admitting the
the present existence of such an antecedent duty as is described in

Subsection (1);

(b) A voluntary transfer of money, a negotiable instrument, or
other property to the obligee of such an antecedent duty as is described in Subsection (1), if made as interest thereon or part payment
thereof or collateral security therefor by the obligor, or by an agent
of the obligor whose authority so to act was not given irrevocably
before the antecedent duty was barred;
(c) A promise to the obligee of such an antecedent duty as is
described in Subsection (1) not to plead the Statute of Limitations
as a defense to an action thereon.

3. An executor, administrator, trustee or guardian who
makes such a promise as that stated in Subsection (1) cannot
by so doing impose a duty upon the estate which h.e represents.
Nor will he be personally bound unless he was bound by the antecedent duty.
Annotation:
Subsection (1) relates expressly to promises and includes those
made before as well as after the debt has become unenforceable by
the lapse of time. There is no question but that a promise is binding
if made after the debt is barred, and, although it has been said that
a promise made before the debt is barred is unenforceable unless there
is new consideration-Gilmore v. Green, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 772, - it
is clear that this is merely a rule of procedure denying the right to
base the action on such new promise and that otherwise, except as
indicated below, it is immaterial whether the promise is made before
or after the statute has run - Crouch'&Admr. v. Grouch, 5 K. L. R.
899. However, in case of an acknowledgment, the time of making
may be very material (subsection 2a, infra), and special circumstances may also make it important to determine whether a promise
was given before or after the statutory period had run. If the promise is made before the debt is barred, the obligation Is extended foil
a period to be determined by the character of the original obligation
but if after the debt is barred, the character of the new promise will
determine the period of extension - See cases cited under Section 85.
Also, if the promise is made after the debt is barred, the new promise
and not the original obligation determines the extent of the liability
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-McDonald's Ezr. v. Underhill's Exr., 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 584 (promise
to pay principal will not revive as to interest then due);-West V.
Williams d Sons, 202 Ky. 382, 259 S. W. 1015 (Promisor must expressly limit his promise and plead the statute in order to secure this
result). Of course, this should also be true of promises made before
the debt is barred, but it is not clear that it would be so held in this
jurisdiction especially since it is insisted that the action be founded
on the old obligation and that the only effect of a promise before the
debt is barred is to extend the period of the obligation.
It must be a promise to fulfill all or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual duty. If an action ex delicto is barred by
the statute of limitations, it cannot be revived by a promise to pay
damages - Luther and Morgan v. Payne, 197 Ky. 359, 247 S. W. 39.
However, by a doctrine of promissory estoppel, if the promise is
before the tort action is barred and is relied on by the injured party
so that the tort action is delayed, the wrongdoer may be estopped to
plead the statute-Chesapeake & N. Ry. v. Speakman, 114 Ky. 628, 71
S. W. 633; Luther and Morgan v. Payne, supra (dictum).
It must be a promise to pay all or part of the obligation as such.
A promise to leave money by will is not effective unless it is, clear
that it was intended as a payment and not as a gift-Schonbachler
v. Schonbachler, 22 K. L. R. 314, 57 S. W. 232. Of course, the promise
and acknowledgment can be made in a will if it is intended as a payment and as such the transfer is not taxable as a testamentary disposition although the debt was barred at the time of the new promiseReamer's Exr. v. Coleman, 226 Ky. 301, 10 S. W. (2d) 1095. It is even
held that a promise to pay, if accompanied -by a statement that the
obligation is unjust, is insufficient, the court here improperly borrowing from the principles governing acknowledgments-McRoberts v.
Hays, 15 K. L. R. 400. It seems that a promise to pay a debt by transferring a horse or other property would be sufficient-Ditto v. Ditto's
Adm., 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 502, But the promise must refer to the debt,
loose statements are not enough-McCrew's Exr. v. O'Donne7, 28
K. L. R. 1366, 92 S. W. 301.
The promise must be by the debtor or by an agent authorized for
that purpose-Lowe v. Thomas' Adm., 12 K. L. R. 46, (holding a promise by an attorney did not extend the period of his client's obligation).
A promise by an heir to pay debts of the testator is binding if at the
time of the promise the debt is not barred and is a legal charge on the
property received, by the promisor-Biakemore v. Blakemore, 19
K. L. R. 1619, 44 S. W. 96. But a part payment by a daughter of the
debtor If made under mistaken belief as to her liability will not
extend the period of the debt-Rafferty v. Bank, 176 Ky. 145, 195 S. W.
429 (apparently no property received). It seems that a principal can
neither revive nor extend the obligation of his surety, but as to the
power of a maker of a negotiable instrument to extend the period
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against a guarantor, see Conn v. Atkinson, 227 Ky. 594, 18 S. W. (2d)
759. As to whom the promise must be made, see Section 92, Infra.
In Kentucky the promise may be either oral or written, there
being no statute requiring a writing-Reamers' Exr. v. Coleman,
supra.
This section expressly excepts promises to pay judgments. It
has been held that a part payment of a judgment that is then barred
will not revive it, but it is intimated that if the payment had been
made before the period had run the obligation would have been continued, and that an express promise after that time would revive it,White v. Moore, 100 Ky. 358, 38 S. W. 505. Since the statute expressly requires "the period to be computed from the date of the last
execution thereon" (K. S. 2514) there is reason to suppose the Restatement will be followed, that the period will not be computed
from the date of a part payment or promise.
In Kentucky this section does not apply to promises, acknowledgments or part payments by a surety. This exception is established by
a long line of cases and is the result of the idea ot moral considers;tion. The court points out that since the surety did not receive the
consideration, he is legally but not morally bound to pay, and, since
there is no moral duty, there is nothing to support the new promise.
It is immaterial whether the promise or payment is made before or
after the bar is complete. See Tillett v. Commonwealth, 48 Ky. (9 B.
Mon.) 438; Emmons v. Overton, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 643; Pusey v.
Smith's Admr., 12 K. L. R. 604; Barnardv. Applegate, 13 K. L. R. 683;
Hurst v. Anderson, 14 K. L. R. 766; Lilly v. Farmer's Bank, 22
K. L. R. 148, 56 S. W. 722; and Fechheimer v. Goldnamer, 169 Ky. 243;
183 S. W. 541.
However, the statute provides that the limitation period in
respect to sureties shall not apply to a period during which the surety obstructs or hinders suit (K. S. 2552) and this has often been
invoked to extend the period against a surety, the theory being that
a promise may hinder the suit, but the real explanation being that of
promissory estoppel (See Section 90, infra.)-Hamiton's Exr. v.
Wright, 27 K. L. R. 1144, 87 S. W. 1093; Newton v. Carson, 80 Ky. 309;
Walker v. Sayers, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 579, dictum, but see Braun v.
Monroe, 8 K. L. R.. 958; Kennedy v. Foster's Exr., 77 Ky. (14 Bush)
479. At least since the adoption of the N. I. L. the obligation of a
negotiable instrument is extended, although perhaps not revived,
against a subsequent guarantor-assignor by a part payment or payment of interest by himself or by the maker-Conn v. Atkinson, 227
Ky. 594, 13 S. W. (2d) 759. And the exception never did extend td
other defenses by a surety, see Section 89, infra.
Subsection 2 (a) says that a voluntary acknowledgment to the
obligee admitting the present existence of the duty operates as a
promise unless circumstances indicate a different intention. This
statement is law in Kentucky. "An acknowledgment, without more
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or less, if clearly and satisfactorily proved, will be sufficient to imply
a promise to pay"--Warren v. Perry, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 447, 451;
Chism v. Barnes, 104 Ky. 310, 319, 47 S. W. 875 and see Head's Rxr.
v. Manner's Admr, 28 Ky. (5 J. J. M.) 255.
But it must be a positive acknowledgment of the obligation as
a subsisting debt and such that will warrant the implication of an
Intention to pay. Loose statements are not sufficient and "if the
acknowledgment Is accompanied by any circumstances or expressions which repel the idea of any intention or willingness, no implied
promise is created"-Gray v. McDowell, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 475. In the
following cases the acknowledgments were held to be insufficient: Bell
v. Rowland's Admr., 3 Ky. (Hardin) 309 (Statement that the debt
was once owing but supposed paid); Tillett v. Linsey d Co., 29 Ky. (6 J.
J. M.) 337 (Statement that the account was just, as far as the debtor
knew but that he did not know and the creditor owed him money)i;'
Head's Exr. v. Manner's Admr., 28 Ky. (5 J. J. M.)
256
(Bare
acknowledgment by an executor is not enough as the executor is not
expected to know whether the debt is owing or not) Ditto v. Ditto's
Adrnr. 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 502 (Admission of some obligation coupled
with statement that some of the items were listed too high); GraV
v. McDowell, supra (Admission coupled with statement that debt is
now barred; Chism v. Barnes, 104 Ky. 310, 47 S. W. 232 (Acknowledgment coupled with statement of inability to pay).
An offer to compromise is not an acknowledgment from which a
promise may be implied-Marcum's Admr. v. Terry, 146 Ky. 145, 142
S. W. 209. Even an express. acknowledgment accompanied by an offer
to compromise is not sufficient since the offer to compromise shows
there is no intention to pay the debt as such-hism v. Barnes, supra.
However, an acknowledgment coupled with a counter-claim will extend the period of the debt less the amount of the counter-claimLaminns v. Carbron'sAdmr., 194 Ky. 246, 238 S. W. 766.
In a few of the cases, the court speaks only of acknowledgments
before the action Is barred, with the implication that a subsequent
acknowledgment would not revive the legal duty. This distinction
is a minority view and unsound (Williston on Contracts, Section 163)
and has not been actually applied in this state. The question was
seemingly raised by counsel and ignored by the Court in Sumrall's
Exrs. v. James, 221 Ky. 498, 299 S. W. 207. The statement in other
cases that it must be an acknowledgment of a "present existing debt"
refers to the manner and not the time of making. However, it is
possible that words which would be sufficient to extend the debt if
spoken before the statute had run, would be insufficient to revive the
debt since In the former case the action is on the original obligation
and In the latter it must be on the words-Lamkins v. Cambro7's
Admr., supra.
The acknowledgment "must be made to the creditor or someone
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authorized to act for him; it is not enough if it be made to a
stranger"--Davis v. Strange, 156 Ky. 420, 161 S. W. 217; Dowell v.
Dowell's Admr., 137 Ky. 167, 125 S. W. 283; Hargis v. Sewell, 87 KY.
63, 7 S. W. 557.
Subsection 2 (b)
states the law in this jurisdiction. A payment in money, either as a partial payment of the principal or as interest will be sufficient either to extend the statutory period or
to revive an obligation that has been barred-Richardson's Admr. v.
Morgan, 233 Ky. 540, 26 S. W. (2d) 32; Conn v. Atkinson, 227 Ky. 594,
13 S. W. (2d) 759; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 197 Ky. 784, 248 S. W. 182;
Radford's Admrs. v. Harris, 144 Ky. 809, 139 S. W, 963. Giving the
creditor other property to sell and apply on the debt is also sufficient
-King v. Nichols, 12 K L. R. 293; Brown's Admr. v. Osborne, 136
Ky. 456, 124 S. W. 405; Kennedy v. Kennedy, supra--as is the giving
of collateral security-Maddox v. Walker's Exr., 25 K. L. R. 124, 74
S. W. 741 (In this case the mortgage contained a statement that the
debt was due.)
But to have this effect it must be a voluntary payment by the
debtor or his authorized agent for that purpose. A payment by a
stranger is not sufficient--Ga77agher v. Whalen, 10 K. L. R. 458, 9
S. W. 390 (By widow of debtor); Rafferty v. Bank, 1.76 Ky. 145, 196
S. W. 429 (Payment by heir. But as to a promise or payment by an
heir or devisee who has received property which at the time Is
charged with the payment of the debt, see Blakemore v. Blakemore,
19 K. L. R. 1619, 44 S. W. 96). The holder of a note cannot extend
or revive it by an unauthorized entry of credit on a cross debt-Rich.
ardson's Admr. v. Morgan, 233 Ky. 540, 26 S. W. (2d) 32; Samuel v.
Samuel's Admr., 151 Ky. 235, 151 S. W. 676; Brown's Admr. v.
Osborne, 136 Ky. 456, 124 S. W. 405. But it seems that a bank might
apply the balance in a checking account as part payment on a note
and so extend the period of limitations-ommonwealth v. Bank of
Kentucky, 5 Ky. Opin. 190-and even a gift by the creditor proved
by an entry on the note made with the consent of the debtor will have
this effect-Kennedy v. Kennedy, supra.
Not only must the payment be made by the debtor or his authorized agent, but it must be made as a payment on the debt to which
the statute applies. "A payment which is made by the debtor under
the impression he is paying something else has never the effect of
reviving the debt"-Price's Admx. v. Price's Admx., 111 Ky. 771, 786,
64 S. W. 746 (In this case the debtor agreed to pay an annuity which
was a little in excess of the interest on the debt and the debt was released. Twenty years later it was claimed on behalf of the creditor
that the agreement was void and the court replied that even if the
agreement to pay the annuity was void, the original obligation was
barred since the payment of the annuity did not keep it alive).
Although several notes are given in one transaction, the payment on
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one does not extend the period as to the others-Pitchford v. Gatewood's Admr., 10 K. L. R. 112. The debtor, in making payment, has
a right to direct the application of the payment to any particular debt
and only that debt will be extended or revived by the part payment.Brown's Admr. v. Osborne, 136 Ky. 456, 124 S. W. 405; Samuel v.
Samuel's Admr., 151 Ky. 235, 151 S. W. 675. In absence of a direction by the debtor the creditor may apply the payment to any of the
debts which are not then barred, or he may distribute it so as to
extend the period as to all-Samuel v. Samuel's Admr., supra, In
absence of direction by the debtor or application by the creditor, it
seems that the law will authorize the application to the oldest debtBrown's Admr. v. Osborne, supra. Part payments on account give
trouble. If it is liquidated, a part payment will revitalize the whole
account unless the debtor directs the payment to some particular
item, and this is true where the debtor knows the items charged for
but does not know the exact amount, but it can not be applied to any
item which the debtor did not know of or have in mind when paying
-Brown's Admr. v. Osborne, supra; Price's Adm. v. Price's Admr.,
supra (dictum at p. 787). But in a suit for board extending over a
nine year period, it was held that each year gives a separate cause
of action and the payments made from time to time were to be
credited only on the account for the year in which made, with the
result that board for the last five years only may be recovered-Kel7um v. Browning's Admr., 231 Ky. 308, 21 S. W. (2d) 459.
The payment must also be one that "will authorize the inference
of a promise to pay the residue"-Richardson v. Chanslor's Trustee,
103 Ky. 425, 438, 45 S. W. 774 (Partial payment made in full settlement is not sufficient).
Subsection 2 (c) states that a promise not to plead the Statute of
Limitations is equivalent to a promise to pay the debt. Of course,
If the promise is made at the time of the formation of the contract
it is supported by consideration and hence is not included in this
section. However, it may be mentioned that our courts have held
agreements in advance not to plead the Statute of Limitations, or
those lengthening or shortening the period, to be void as against public policy, Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 119 Ky. 261, 83 S. W.
615 discusses fully and cites the decisions prior to 1904. For later
discussion see Continental Casualty Co. v. Harrod, 30 K. L. R. 1117 ,
100 S. W. 262; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Henderson Cotton Mills, 120 Ky.
218, 85 S. W. 1090; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dickerson, 213 Ky. 305,
280 S. W. 1106 (dictum) and Wright v. Gardner,98 Ky. 454, 33 S. W.
622 (attempt to lengthen the time in which a claim be made). Nd
cases have been found involving promises not to plead the statute
which were made after the debt became due and it is possible that
such a promise might be considered as an acknowledgment and sufficient for implying a promise to pay in accordance with this section.
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Subsection 8 deals with promises by executors, administrators,
trustees or guardians. In the older cases it was held that a promiso
bY an executor has the same effect as if it had been made by the
testator himself-Vorthcut's Admr. v. Wilkinson, 51 Ky. (12 B. M.)
408. This was true even if the debt was barred at the time of the
promise-Head's Bxr. v. Manners' Aimr., 28 Ky. (5 J. J. M.) 255
(In which it is held, however, that a bare acknowledgment by an
executor is not sufficient); Thomas v. Daniers Admr., 7 K. L. R. 98.
But it was later held that at best the action by an administrator only
binds the assets in his hands and that the promise will not prevent
-n heir or devisee from relying on the plea of limitations-Jones v.
Mitchell's Adm., 9 K. L. R. 858; Withers' Adm. v. Withers' Heirs, 30,
K. L. R. 1099, 100 S. W. 253; Grotenkemper v. Bryson, 79 Ky. 353
(which implies that an executor can not even subject the assets in
his hands to the payment of a debt if the heirs object.) Nor can a
city council, without express statutory authority, extend the liability
of the city on bonds-IWurth v. City of Paducah,116 Ky. 403, 76 S. W.
143.

Section 87.

PROMISE TO PAY A DEBT DISCHARGED IN

BANK-

RUPTCY IS BINDING.

Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to pay all or
part of a debt of the promisor, discharged or dischargeable in
bankruptcy proceedings begun before the promise is made, is
binding.
Annotation:
This statement includes promises made after bankruptcy proceedings are begun and before discharge as well as those made after the
debt is discharged. Our courts do not go that far. A promise made
after the discharge is binding-Peoples Bank v. Baker, 238 Ky. 473, 38
S. W. (2d) 225; Damron v. P-ikeville Grocery Go., 222 Ky. 749, 2 S. W.
(2d) 366. But it has been held that a promise made before discharge
although after proceedings are begun, is not binding-Graves v.
M Guire, Helm & Co., 79 Ky. 532; Ogden v. Redd, 76 Ky. (13 Bush)
581. However, if the promise made at this time is supported by new
consideration it is binding-Thornberry's Admr. v. Dils, 80 Ky. 241;
see also Graves v. McGuire, Helm & Co., supra (dicta, also to tho
effect that the debtor may be estopped in certain cases). Like a
promise to pay a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations, the
promise after bankruptcy must be "clear, distinct, and unequivocal"
-Brooks v. Paine, 26 K. L. R. 1125, 77 S. W. 190; Jones v. Talbott, 13
K. L. R. 303-and the action is based on the new promise and not on
the original obligation-Carson v. Osborne, 49 Ky. (10 B. M.) 155;
Egbert v. McMichael, 48 Ky. (9 B. M.) 44; Graham v. Hunt, 47 Ky.
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(8 B. M.) 7. Unlike the rule in regard to the Statute of Limitations,
neither a mere acknowledgment of the obligation nor part payment
is sufficient in this case-Green v. Mc&owan, 7 K_ L. R. 661 (acknowledgment); Jones v. Talbott (dictum as to acknowledgment); Tolle
v. emith, 98 Ky. 464, 33 S. W. 410 (part payment).
A conditional promise will be sufficient (see section 91, infra),
but the fact that it is conditional must appear in the pleadings and the
creditor must also allege and prove the happening of the conditionBrooks v. Paine, 25 K. L. R. 1125, 77 S. W. 190; Tolle v. Smith, supra;
Egbert v. McMichael, supra.
This section does not apply to promises made after a voluntary
discharge by act of the creditors-Montgomery v. Lampton, 60 Ky.
(3 Met.) 519.

Section 88. PRoMIsE To FULFILL A DUTY IN SPITE OF NONPERFORMANCE OF A CoNDITIoN is BINDING WiWEN.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) and in Section 93,
a promise to fulfill all or part of an antecedent conditional duty
in spite of the non-fulfillment of the condition is binding,
whether the promise is made before or after the time for fulfilling the condition, if performance of the condition is not a substantial part of what was to have been given in exchange for the
performance of the antecedent duty, and if the uncertainty of
the happening of the condition was not a substantial element
in inducing the formation of the contract;
(2) If a promise such as stated in Subsection (1) is made
before the time for fulfilling the condition has expired and the
condition is some performance by the promisee or other beneficiary of the contract, the promisor can make his duty again
subject to the condition by giving notice of his intention so to
do before there has been any substantial change of position by
the promisee or beneficiary and while there is still reasonable
lime to perform the condition.
Annotation:
This section covers what is generally entitled "waiver of defenses." That a promise to fulfill a contractual duty in spite o4 the
non-performance of a condition is binding is illustrated by decisions
involving conditions in insurance policies-Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Hartley, 24 K. L. R. 57, 67 S. W. 19, 68 S. W. 1081 (acts of agent held
to imply a promise to pay the policy despite non-performance of condition as to payment of premiums); Hoover v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
227 Ky. 88, 11 S. W. (2d) 976 (Same except fire insurance); Mudd v.
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German Ins. Co., 22 K. L. R. 308, 56 S. W. 977. It has been held that
an agent has the power to waive performance of conditions in insurance policies by a verbal promise even if the policy provides that no
alteration or modification of the contract shall be valid unless evidenced by writing-NVew Orleans Ins. Co. v. O'Brian, 8 K. L. R. 785;
German-American Ins. Co. v. Yeflow Poplar Lbr. Co., 27 K. L. R. 105
84 S. W. 551. But see Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Berryman, 193 Ky. 7,
234 S. W. 748. This section states that such promises are binding
without consideration and they have often been treated as an application of the doctrine of estoppel (see. 90 infra) and in other cases
as a new oral contract.
This section is also illustrated by an express or implied promise
by a buyer to pay for defective goods--Jones Bros. v. McEwan, 91 Ky.
373, 16 S. W. 81; Porsythe v. Russell Co., 148 Ky. 490, 146 S. W. 1103;
Albin Co. v. Kentucky Table Go., 23 K. L. R. 2261, 67 S. W. 13. 1 In
these cases it is held that acceptance of the goods with knowledge of
the defects is sufficient to imply a promise to pay the full contract
price br a waiver of the right to recover on a breach of warranty, but
this may have been changed by the adoption of the Uniform Sales
Act in 1928 (Ky. Stat. 2651b-49). Occupancy of a building Is not
alone a waiver of the defects in construction-Cassinelli v. Stacy, 238
Ky. 827, 38 S. W. (2d) 980.
This section is also illustrated by waiver of technical defenses by
a surety. See Young v. New Farmer's Bank, 102 Ky. 257, 43 S. W.
473 (promise to pay after a contract extending time to the maker);
Crutcher v. Trabue, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 80, 85 (promise by surety before
time extended to principal); Higgins v. MorrisoW's Exr., 34 Ky. (4
Dana) 100, 103 (promise after discharge because of lack of notice)
Mardis v. Tyler, 49 Ky. (10 B. M.) 376. But this does not apply to
promises after a surety is discharged by effect of the Statute of
Limitations as shown by the decisions cited under Section 87.

Section 89. PROMISE TO PEarORM A VOIDABLE DUTY IS
BINDING.

Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to perform all or
part of an antecedent contract of the promisor, theretofore

voidable by him, but not avoided prior to the making of the
promise, is binding.
Annotation:
This section would probably be followed in Kentucky although in
the few cases which have arisen, the new promise is spoken of as
a "ratification" or "waiver" with the original contract as the foundation of the obligation. This is, of course, true in case of conveyances
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where the title passes at the time of the deed by the infant and not
at the time of the new deed or "afflrmance"--Phillips v. Green, 21 Ky.
implies that the suit
(5 T. B. Mon.) 344. However, K. S. 470 (2)
may be on the new promise.
No case involving a new promise after the discovery of fraud has
been found. New promises by sureties are covered under Section 38,
supra.
In case of contracts by Infants, a new promise after reaching
majority is binding--,J. I. Case Machine Co. v. Dulworth, 216 Ky. 637,
287 S. W. 994 (renewal note). But the promise must be made after
reaching majority with the deliberate purpose of assuming a liability
from which he knows he is discharged by law, and must be Made
.
to the creditor or his agent-Petty v. Roberts, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 4101
By statute, the new promise must be in writing-K. S. 470 (2). But
it seems that the statute is satisfied by a writing addressed to one
other than the creditor or his agent-Stern v. Freeman, 61 Ky. (4
Metc.) 309.
This section relates only to voidable obligations. If a promise
by a married woman is void, a new promise made after discoverture
Is not binding--Gilbert v. Brown, 29 K. L. R. 1248, 97 S. W. 46;
Holloway's Assignee v. Rudy, 22 K. L. R. 1406, 60 S. W. 650.

Section 90.

PROMISE REASoNABLY INDUCING DEFINITE AND

SUBSTANTIAL ACTION IS BINDn-G.
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided, only
by enforcement of the promise.

Annotation:
Our Court in handling this problem frequently escapes the doctrine of promissory estoppel by treating the reasonably induced
action as requested, for example, see Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173,
27 S. W. (2d) 695 (the court also finds other consideration in' this
case). And in other cases the Court has reached the same result by
making the promise the foundation for an action or defense of fraud,
saying "if by means of a promise alone, another is influenced to
change his position so that he cannot be placed in statu quo and will
be seriously damaged unless the promise is fulfilled, then the refusal
to perform is fraud"--Daniel v. Daniel, 190 Ky. 210, 226 S. W. 1070.
See also Tillett v. Rainey, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 438, but see Emmerson
v. Zimmerman, 5 K. L. R. 767, contra.
In other cases recovery has been allowed on a promise unsupported by consideration as provided by this section-Morton v. Fletch-
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er, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. M.) 137 (a promise by maker to innocent
assignee of a note given for an illegal consideration is binding if the
assignee relies thereon and thus loses recourse against his assignor);
Cooper v. Jackson, 22 K. L. R. 295, 57 S. W. 254 (a promise of the
payee of a note to extend time for an indefinite period if followed by
a reasonable forbearance in reliance on the promise of a third party
to pay is sufficient).

Section 91.

PROMISES ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS

86-90 IF

CONDITIONAL ARE PERFORMABLE ONLY ON HAPPENING OF CONDITION.

If a promise within the terms of Sections 86, 87, 88, 89,
and 90 is in terms conditional or performable at a future time
the promisor is bound thereby, but performance becomes due
only upon the happening of the condition or upon the arrival of
the specified time.
Annotation:
This section states the law in Kentucky. If the promise is to
pay when able, the creditor must prove the ability-ToZe v. Smith's
Exr., 98 Ky. 464, 33 S. W. 410; Eckler v. Galbraith & Lail, 75 Ky. (12
Bush) 71; Mason v. Hughart, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 480; Green v.
McGowan, 7 K. L. R. 661. And the fact that the promise is conditional must appear in the declaration-Egbert v. McMichael, 48 Ky.
(9 B. Mon.) 44; Buford v. Crigler, 7 K. L. R. 662. If conditional, the
statute of limitations starts to run only from the happening of the
condition-Rankin v. Anderson, 24 K. L. R. 647, 69 S. W. 705.
Of course, if the new promise is contained in an offer to compromise or conditioned upon other act or agreement of the promisee,
it is of no effect until acceptance-Farrells Admr. v. Records, 187 Ky.
468, 219 S. W. 792; Marcum's Admx. v. Perry, 146 Ky. 1,45, 142 S. W.
209. But this has been carried further so as to seemingly require an
acceptance of all conditional promises-Brashears v. Combs, 174 Ky.
344, 192 S. W. 482.

Section 92. To WHOM
86-89 MUsT BE, MADE.

PROMISES ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS

The new promise referred to in Sections 86, 87, 88, and 89
must be made to the person to whom the money is then due,
or to the promisor's surety or co-principal or indemnitor
Annotation:
Kentucky decisions are in accord with this statement. A promise
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or acknowledgment to a stranger is not sufficient. The promise must
be made to the creditor "or someone authorized to act for him"-Davis v. Strange, 156 Ky. 420, 161 S. W. 217; Dowell v. Dowell's Admr.,
137 Ky. 167, 125 S. W. 283. This is frequently stated as "to the creditor, or someone acting for him, and upon which the creditor is to
act and conflde"-Hargis v. Sewell's Admr., 87 Ky. 63, 7 S. W. 557;
Trousdale's AMmr. v. Anderson, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 276; Bain V. Sawy/ers, 14 K. L. R. 857.
A promise of one executor to his joint executor was held tot be
sufficient, but in this case the promisee was also the sole beneficiary of
the promise-Hendrix's Admr. v. Hendrix, 29 K. L. R. 1084, 96 S. W.
921. A promise to the creditor's wife was held to be binding in a
case where the debt arose from the sale of her property, but the
court speaks as if the relationship would be sufficient--Jones v. Talbott, 13 K. L. R. 303. The publication by a bank of a financial
statement which listed a certified check as a liability is not a sufficient
acknowledgment to the creditor-Blades v. Grant County Deposit
Bank, 21 K. L. R. 1761, 56 S. W. 415.
This section is not to be confused with the requirement that in
case of contracts made during Infancy, the ratification must be in
writing (K. S. 470) for it seems that in such a case a writing addressed to a stranger will be sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds
-Stern v. Freeman, 61 Ky. (4 Metc.) 309.

Section 93. IOMISES ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS 86-89 NOT
BINDING iF

DE IN IGNORANCE O1 FACTS.

A promise within the terms of Sections 86, 87, 88 or 89 is
not binding unless the promisor knew or had reason to know the
essential facts of the previous transaction to which the promise
relates, but his knowledge of the legal effect of the facts is
immaterial.
Annotation:
Our decisions require knowledge of the essential facts at the
time the promise is made and goes beyond this statement in seemingly
requiring a knowledge of the legal effect of the fact% in order to make
the promise binding, at least in cases where the promisor is a surety
or one other than the original debtor-Rafferty v. Bank of Hardinsburg, 176 Ky. 145, 195 S. W. 429 (After a cause was barred against an
ancestor, voluntary payments by an heir were said not to revive the
obligation "since it Is clear that these payments were made in ignorance of her rights and In the mistaken belief she was liable for her
father's debts"). Ti~lett v. Rainey, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 438 (a surety
must act "with knowledge of his legal condition and rights with
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respect to the bond"); Young v. New
uFarmer'sBank, 102 Ky. 257, 43
S. W. 473 (evidence that a surety, at the time of making the promise,
was not aware of having been released by an extention of time, is
competent). However, it is not essential that a primary debtor know
the legal effect of his promise-Brashears v. Combs, 174 Ky. 344, 192
S. W. 482. As to knowledge inferred from the promise, see Madis v.
Tyler, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 376.

Section 94.
Agreements

STnmI

TIoNs.

with reference to a

proceeding pending in

court, made by attorneys representing adverse parties to the

proceeding, are not deprived of legal operation because of lack
of consideration, nor, if made in the presence of the Court, be-

cause made orally.

If not made in the presence of the Court,

a writing is generally required by statute or rule of court.

Annotation:
Kentucky decisions are in accord as to the effect of stipulations
-binco7n County Board of Education v. Trustees, 225 Ky. 21, 7 S. W.
(2d) 499; Continental Realty Co. v. Mowbray & Robinson Co., 187 Ky.
98, 218 S. W. 726; Taylor & Crate v. Forester,148 Ky. 201, 146 S. W.
428.
Seemingly it is not required that the stipulation be in writing,
a "verbal" agreement consented to by the court being sufficientMcCreary County v. Bryant, 173 Ky. 363, 191 S. W. 119 (Made in the
presence of the Court in this case); Chambers v. SimpsoW's Admx.,
17 Ky. (1 T. B. Mon.) 112. In McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v.
Harned, 6 K. L. R. 665, the Court refused to recognize an oral stipulation which attempted to avoid written amendments to the pleadings
as provided by the Code.
(To be Continued)
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